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Abstract
We consider sequences of games G = {G1, G2, . . .} where, for all n, Gn has the same set of
players. Such sequences arise in the analysis of running time of players in games, in electronic
money systems such as Bitcoin and in cryptographic protocols. Assuming that one-way functions
exist, we prove that there is a sequence of 2-player zero-sumBayesian games G such that, for all n,
the size of every action in Gn is polynomial in n, the utility function is polynomial computable
in n, and yet there is no polynomial-time Nash equilibrium, where we use a notion of Nash
equilibrium that is tailored to sequences of games. We also demonstrate that Nash equilibrium
may not exist when considering players that are constrained to perform at most T computational
steps in each of the games {Gi}
∞
i=1
. These examples may shed light on competitive settings where
the availability of more running time or faster algorithms lead to a “computational arms race”,
precluding the existence of equilibrium. They also point to inherent limitations of concepts such
“best response” and Nash equilibrium in games with resource-bounded players.
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1 Introduction
Computation dealing with large amounts of data is fundamental to many fields such as data-mining,
artificial intelligence and algorithmic trading. In the “big-data” era, the need for faster algorithms
and more powerful computing machines is ever-growing, and is amplified by competition between
firms. Competitive settings, where competing parties keep searching for more efficient algorithms
and building more powerful hardware, lead to a natural question: what is the likely outcome of such
competition in the long run and, in particular, is some kind of equilibrium likely to be reached?
We model such settings using tools from game theory and complexity theory. Formally, consider
computational games [8] {G1, G2, . . .}, where for all n, Gn is a finite game. We assume that each
player chooses a Turing machine (TM) that, given n, computes a strategy for the player in Gn.
Computational games arise in several settings. One example is “crypto-currencies” such as Bitcoin.
An essential ingredient of Bitcoin (e.g., [3]) is miners who solve challenging cryptographic problems,
whose solution is later used in verifying transactions in the system. Miners get electronic cash
rewards for solving such puzzles. Bitcoin keeps the average time at which puzzles are solved a
constant by making the cryptographic problem needed to be solved harder and harder, forcing
miners to examine a larger number of possible solutions. In this way, it deals with technological
advances that allow faster solution to cryptographic puzzles. Such a scenario can be modeled as
a sequence of games, where in the nth game the miner is required to solve a cryptographic puzzle
Pn where the number of candidate solutions that need to be examined in order to solve Pn is a
function of n.
Cryptographic protocols such as commitment schemes [1] provide another example of compu-
tational games. A commitment scheme consists of two parties; a sender and a receiver. In the
first step of this protocol, the sender chooses a bit b and sends an encryption of b to the receiver,
committing the sender to b without revealing b to the receiver. Next, the receiver chooses a bit;
Finally in the third step, the sender reveals the bit to the receiver. This protocol can be viewed as
a game where the receiver wins if the bit he chooses matches the bit revealed; the sender wins if
they do not match. Clearly, if the receiver can break the scheme and deduce the sender’s bit, the
receiver wins; if the sender can cheat (“reveal” a bit that does not necessarily match what he com-
mitted to), the sender wins. The encryption at the first step involves a security parameter k, where
larger security parameters provide more security (i.e.., more running time is required to break the
scheme). This can be modeled as a sequence of games, where in the kth game the sender encrypts
the bit using a security parameter k (see also [8]). Many cryptographic protocols, including secret
sharing and multiparty computation, can be viewed as games in this way.1
We focus on resource-bounded players, continuing a long line of work in game theory (e.g., [13,
14, 15, 16]). We begin by studying players that are polynomial-time bounded. For a sequence G =
{G1, G2, . . .}, this requirement entails that for all n, both the actions performed by players in Gn and
the computation of utilities can be done in time polynomial in n. We also assume that the length
of every action is polynomial in n. We call sequences of games with these properties polynomial
games. These games seem to capture intended applications such as Bitcoin and cryptographic
protocols.
One of the most widely used solution concepts in game theory is Nash equilibrium (NE). In
1The games used to model such protocols are extensive-form games. Our results demonstrate non-existence of
equilibrium in Bayesian games, which are a special case of extensive-form games. Hence, our non-existence results
carry over to extensive-form games.
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a Nash equilibrium, no player can improve his utility by deviating unilaterally from his strategy.
NE can be extended to polynomial games {G1, G2, . . .} [8]. We assume that every game Gj is a
k-player game and that for 1 ≤ i ≤ k, player i uses a TM Mi that computes his actions in Gj
given j. Roughly speaking, a machine profile (M1, . . . ,Mk) consisting of polynomial time TMs
is a polynomial-time NE if, for every player, replacing his TM by a different (polynomial-time)
TM gives him at most a negligible improvement to his utility. There are certain subtleties in this
definition; see Definition 5 and the discussion thereafter for more detail. We show that, assuming
the existence of one-way functions, there are polynomial 2-player zero-sum games for which no
polynomial-time Nash equilibrium exists. The idea is to simulate the “largest integer game” in this
setting, the game where players simultaneously output an integer, and the player who chooses the
largest integer wins. Clearly this game has no Nash equilibrium [12]. We can effectively simulate
this game by presenting players with multiple one-way function puzzles, requiring players to invert
as many puzzles as possible. We can ensure that a player with sufficiently (polynomially) more
running time can invert more puzzles. Thus, we get an “arms race” with no equilibrium. This
example points to an inherent difficulty in analyzing games with polynomially bounded players.
Namely, in such games there is often no best response; players can use longer and longer running
times to improve their payoffs. Interestingly, a similar phenomenon has been observed in Bitcoin,
where miners use increasingly more sophisticated computational devices for the mining operation
(see [3] and the reference within).
Finally, we demonstrate that Nash equilibrium may fail to exist even if players are constrained
to run for at most T steps for a fixed integer T , without asymptotics kicking in. The idea is to let
players first play a game (matching pennies) that requires randomization to achieve equilibrium, and
then effectively give the player with greater remaining running time an additional bonus. Assuming
that the generation of a random bit requires computational effort, this game cannot have a Nash
equilibrium.
We may hope that, in our examples, even if there does not exist a NE, there might exist an
ǫ-NE for some small ǫ. However all our arguments for the non-existence of NE also show the
non-existence of ǫ-NE for some appropriate ǫ > 0.
Polynomial games bear some similarities to succinct games. In succinct games, there exists
a circuit C that calculates the utility C(x1, x2, . . . , xk) of the players once they choose the ac-
tions x1, x2, . . . , xk ∈ {0, 1}
m. It is known that, given a 2-player zero-sum succinct game, it is
EXP-hard to find a NE [9, 10] (see also [18]). Our results regarding the non-existence of NE in
polynomial games are incomparable to these results. We are concerned with polynomial-time com-
putable strategies. Considering polynomially bounded players (as opposed to unbounded players)
may drastically change the set of Nash equilibria in succinct games. Indeed, a NE for a sequence of
games {G1, G2, . . .} with polynomially bounded players may fail to be a Nash equilibrium for Gn
for all n ≥ 1: for an example, see the end of Section 3. For similar reasons, the PPAD-hardness
results of finding a Nash equilibrium in a fixed game [2, 4] cannot be applied in our setting either.
2 Preliminaries
We begin by defining Bayesian games.
Definition 1. A k-player normal-form Bayesian game is described by a tuple (J,B, T, P, v), where
• J is a set of k players (we identify J with [k] = {1, . . . , k});
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• B =
∏k
i=1Bi, where Bi is a finite set for all i ∈ [k] consisting of the available actions of
player i;
• T =
∏k
i=1 Ti, where Ti is a finite set called the type space of player i;
• P is a probability distribution over T ;
• v = (v1, . . . , vk), where for all i, vi is a function from B × T to the real numbers.
In our settings, it will often be the case that all types are perfectly correlated: all players have
the same type and all players know the type of every other player. Observe that normal-form
games can be viewed as a special case of Bayesian games (where the type space is a singleton).
Finally, since we are concerned here mainly with Bayesian games, when we write “game” we mean
“Bayesian game”, unless explicitly stated otherwise.
A pure strategy si for player i is a map si : Ti → Bi; a strategy si maps the type ti ∈ Ti of
player i to an action si(ti) ∈ Bi. We denote by ∆(Bi) the set of all probability distribution over
Bi; let ∆ = Π
k
i=1∆(Bi). A mixed-strategy si for player i is a function mapping type ti ∈ Ti to an
element of ∆(Bi). We denote by si(ti, bi) the probability assigned by a mixed strategy si(ti) to
bi ∈ Bi. The expected utility of player i with the mixed strategy profile s = (s1, . . . , sk) (where
t = (t1, . . . , tk) ∈ T , b = (b1, . . . , bk) ∈ B, and (s1(t1), . . . , sk(tk)) ∈ ∆) is given by
Vi(s) =
∑
t∈T
P (t)
∑
b∈B
(
k∏
i=1
si(ti, bi)
)
vi(t, b). (1)
Note that there are two sources of uncertainty in the utility of a player choosing a mixed action:
the probability distribution over other players actions and the distribution P over the type space.
Definition 2. Let G = (J,B, T, P, v) be a k-player Bayesian game and suppose that ǫ ≥ 0. A
mixed-strategy profile s = (s1, . . . , sk) is an ǫ-Nash equilibrium (ǫ-NE for short) if, for all players
i and all mixed strategies s′i, we have that
Vi(s) ≥ Vi(s
′
i, s−i)− ǫ.
(As usual, if s = (s1, . . . , sk) then s−i = (s1, . . . , si−1, si+1, . . . , sk) is the tuple excluding. si.) When
ǫ = 0, we have a Nash equilibrium.
To reason about resource-bounded players in games, we consider a sequence {G1, G2, . . .} of
games where, for all n, Gn = (J,B
n, T n, Pn, vn) is a k-player game (k is fixed and does not depend
on n). We adapt the definition of [8], which in turn is based on earlier definitions by Dodis, Halevy
and Rabin [5] and Megiddo and Wigderson [13], and is applied to extensive-form games, to Bayesian
games. For an integer s, recall that {0, 1}≤s is the set of all bit strings of length at most s.
Definition 3. A computational game G = {G1, G2, . . .} is a sequence of normal-form Bayesian
games, where Gn = ([k], B
n, T n, Pn, vn) , such that
• The set of players in Gn, [k], is the same for all n.
• For all n and all i, Bni ⊆ {0, 1}
≤m for some finite m (that may depend on n).
• For all n and all i, T ni ⊆ {0, 1}
≤r for some finite r (that may depend on n).
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• For all i ∈ [k] and n, there is a TM M such that, given b ∈ Bn, t ∈ T n, and 1n, computes
vni (b, t).
G is bounded if there exist constants 0 < c < C such that for all n, b ∈ Bn, and t ∈ T n we have
that vni (b, t) 6= 0⇒ |v
n
i (b, t)| ∈ [c, C].
When dealing with games with polynomial-time players, we require slightly stronger properties
summarized in the definition below. Following the definition of polynomial games for extensive-
form games [8], we define polynomial games for a sequence of Bayesian games.
Definition 4. A computational game G = {G1, G2, . . .} is a polynomial game if the following
conditions hold:
• There exist a polynomial p such that, for all n and all i, Bni = {0, 1}
≤p(n).
• There exist a polynomial q such that, for all n and all i, T ni = {0, 1}
≤q(n).
• For all i ∈ [k] and n, there is a TM M such that, given b = (b1, . . . , bk) ∈ B
n, t ∈ T n, and
1n, computes vni (b, t) and runs in time polynomial in n.
A strategy for player j in a computational game G is a TM Mj that, given 1
n and the type
tj ∈ T
n
j , outputs a randomized strategy Mj(1
n, tj) for player j in game Gn, that is, probability
distribution over Bnj . Mj(1
n) is the strategy defined by taking Mj(1
n)(tj) = Mj(1
n, tj). The utility
of player i in Gn given a machine profile (M1 . . .Mk) is V
n
i (M1(1
n), . . . ,Mk(1
n)) (as defined in (1)).
To analyze computational games G = {G1, G2, . . .}, we would like to be able to apply classical
game-theoretic notions, such as best response and Nash equilibrium, to sequences of games. How-
ever, there are certain difficulties in generalizing these notions to computational games. A first
obstacle is that sequences of infinite games may allow resource-bounded players to improve over
any strategy by doing additional polynomial-time computations. For example, consider a player
who gets a payoff of 1 by breaking an encrypted massage E(s) with s ∈ {0, 1}n and a payoff of 0 if
he does not break it, where the player’s running time is polynomial in n. Assuming that there is no
polynomial-time algorithm (in n) for finding s given E(s), there is no best response in this game,
as a player can always make polynomially many additional “guesses” on top of his current action,
increasing his expected utility. As pointed out by Dodis, Halevi, and Rabin [5], this observation
applies to many problems of interest, such as those arising from cryptographic protocols [5].
One way around this problem, suggested in [5, 8], is to ignore negligible additive changes in the
utility of players, where a sequence δ(n) is negligible if for every polynomial p, p(n) = o(δ(n)−1).
That is, deviations that result in a negligible increase in utility are not considered to be improve-
ments. Ignoring negligible terms suffices to ensure the existence of equilibrium in a number of
games of interest for which there would not be an equilibrium otherwise [5].
If we ignore negligible change, then given a machine profile M , changing the behavior of a TM
M in finitely many games will not be a deviation breaking an alleged equilibrium, as altering a
sequence δ(n) on finitely many n’s does not change the fact that δ(n) is negligible. On the other
hand, a deviation that improves a given player utility on infinitely many n’s by improves a given
player’s utility on infinitely many n’s by a constant δ > 0 implies that the machine profile is not
a NE. Finally, it is worth noting that if the utilities of players are exponentially small (say, on the
order of 1/2n in the game Gn), a negligible additive term can have a noticeable effect on the utility
of players; on the other hand, if utilities are exponentially large, even a (non-negligible) constant
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change in utilities would be viewed as negligible. In order to avoid such scaling issues, we deal
exclusively with bounded games when considering solution concepts for computational games.
Definition 5. Let M be a set of TMs and let ǫ ≥ 0 be a constant independent of n. A profile
M = (M1, . . . ,Mk) of TMs is an ǫ-M-NE for a bounded computational game G with respect to M,
if (a) for all i, Mi ∈ M, and (b) there exists a negligible sequence δ(n) such that, for all M
′
i ∈ M
and all n > 0 and all i ∈ [k] we have that
Vi(Mi(1
n),M−i(1
n)) ≥ Vi(M
′
i(1
n),M−i(1
n))− ǫ− δ(n). (2)
When ǫ = 0, we say that M is aM-Nash equilibrium. IfM is the set of all probabilistic polynomial-
time TMs, we say M is a polynomial ǫ-NE.
We can discuss polynomial-time players, best response, and equilibrium even if the action space
of every player is of super-polynomial size. However, in this case, there are trivial examples showing
that a NE may not exist. For example, one can take Gn to be the 2-player zero-sum game where
each player outputs an integer of length at most 22
n
(written in binary) and the player outputting
the larger integer receives payoff 1, with both players getting 0 in case of equality. Clearly this
sequence of games does not have a polynomial equilibrium.
3 Games With No Polynomial Equilibrium
As we now show, there is a polynomial game for which there is no polynomial NE, assuming one-way
functions exist. We find it convenient to use the definition of one-way function given in [11].
Definition 6. Given s : IN → IN , t : IN → IN , a one-way function with security parameter
s against a t-bounded inverter is a family of functions fk : {0, 1}
k → {0, 1}m, k = 1, 2, 3, . . .,
satisfying the following properties:
• m = kb for some positive constant b;
• there is a TM M such that, given x with |x| = k computes fk(x) in time polynomial in k;
• for all but finitely many k’s and all probabilistic TM M ′, running in time at most t(k) for a
given input fk(x),
P[fk(M
′(fk(x))) = fk(x)] <
1
s(k)
,
where the probability P is taken over x sampled uniformly from {0, 1}k and the randomness
of M ′.
We assume that exponential one-way functions exist. Specifically, we assume that there exists
a one-way function that is 2k/10-secure against a 2k/30-bounded inverter. The existence of a one-
way function with these parameters follows from an assumption made by Wee [19] regarding the
existence of exponential non-uniform one-way functions. Given fk(x), we say an algorithm inverts
fk(x) if it finds some z such that fk(x) = fk(z).
We can now demonstrate the non-existence of polynomial-time computable equilibrium in a
polynomial game.
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Theorem 1. If there exists a one-way function that is 2k/10-secure against a 2k/30-inverter, then,
for all ǫ > 0, there exists a 2-player zero-sum polynomial game G that has no polynomial ǫ-NE.
Proof. We first prove the theorem for ǫ = 0 and then show how to extend it to arbitrary ǫ > 0. Let
G = {G1, G2, . . .} be the following polynomial game, which we call the one-way function game. For
all n, we define Gn as follows. There are two players, 1 and 2. Fix a one-way function {fk}k≥1 that
is 2k/10-secure against a 2k/30-bounded inverter. The type space is the same for each player, and
consists of tuples of l = ⌈log n⌉ bitstrings of the form (f⌈logn⌉(x1), . . . , f⌈log n⌉2(xl)). The distribution
on types is generated by choosing xi ∈ {0, 1}
i⌈log n⌉ uniformly at random, and choosing the xi’s
independently. Given his type tn = (f⌈logn⌉(x1), . . . , f⌈log n⌉2(xl)}, player j outputs y
j
1, . . . , y
j
l . A
hit for player j is an index i such that fi⌈logn⌉(y
j
i ) = fi⌈logn⌉(xi). Let aj denote how many hits
player j gets. The payoff of player j is 1 if aj − a3−j > 0. If aj − a3−j = 0, both players receive
a payoff of 0. Observe that the utility function of each player is polynomial-time computable in
n. Clearly the length of every action of Gn is polynomial in n and so is the length of the type tn.
Hence the one-way function game is a polynomial game.
We now prove that there cannot be a polynomial-time NE for G. game. Suppose, by way of
contradiction, that there is a NE (M1,M2) for G. Choose r > 1 such that the running time of both
M2 and M2 is bounded by n
r for sufficiently large n.
We claim that, for all n sufficiently large, for all i ≥ 60r, the probability that Mj inverts
fi⌈logn⌉(xi) is at most
1
2i⌈log n⌉/10
. To prove this claim, suppose by way of contradiction that if there
exists i ≥ 60r such that, infinitely many n’s, Mj inverts fi⌈logn⌉(xi) with too large a probability,
then we get a contradiction to {fk}k≥1 being a one-way function. The idea is to useMj to construct
a TM M ′j that can invert fk(xk) for infinitely many k’s with probability that is larger than
1
s(k) .
First suppose that given x with |x| = s⌈logm⌉ where 30r < s ≤ ⌈logm⌉, it is the case that given
1m and fi⌈logm⌉(xi) for all 1 ≤ i ≤ ⌈logm⌉, we have that Mj inverts fs⌈logm⌉(xm) in time m
r with
probability greater than 2−s⌈logm⌉/10 = 2−|x|/10. Then there is a TM Mj” that inverts fs⌈logm⌉(x)
in time at most 2mr with probability greater than 2−|x|/10. Mj” simply generates fi⌈logm⌉(xi) for
all i 6= s in the range [1 . . . ⌈logm⌉], where xi ∈ {0, 1}
i⌈logm⌉ is selected uniformly at random. By
the definition of one-way function, generating all these xi’s can be done in time o(m). Next Mj”
generates 1m and runs Mj on the sequence of strings {f⌈logm⌉(x1), . . . , f⌈logm⌉2(x⌈logm⌉)} and 1
m.
The total running of Mj” is at most m
r+o(mr) < 2mr and the probability Mj” inverts fs⌈logm⌉(x)
is identical to that of Mj .
Consider now an arbitrary x ∈ {0, 1}∗. Suppose that |x| is of the form s⌈logm⌉ with s ≤ ⌈logm⌉.
Furthermore, assume s is the largest integer such that |x| = s⌈logm⌉ with s ≤ ⌈logm⌉ (equivalently
m is the smallest integer such that |x| = s⌈logm⌉ for an integer s ≤ ⌈logm⌉). Clearly there
are at most s ≤ ⌈logm⌉ distinct ways to write |x| as a product of integers s′ and t such that
t = ⌈logm′⌉ for an integer m′ and s′ ≤ ⌈logm′⌉. Suppose now there exist two integers s′,m′ with
s′ ≥ 30r + 1 such that |x| = s′⌈logm′⌉ and that Mj(f⌈logm′⌉(x1), . . . , f⌈logm′⌉2(x⌈logm′⌉), 1
m′) runs
in time (m′)r and inverts fs⌈logm′⌉(x) with probability larger than
1
2s′⌈logm′⌉/10
. Since s′ > 30r + 1,
and as ⌈logm′⌉ ≥ ⌈logm⌉, we have that the running time of Mj given the type and 1
m′ is at most
(m′)r ≤ 2s
′⌈logm′⌉/30−⌈logm⌉/30 = 2|x|/30m−1/30.
As before, Mj can be converted to a TM Mj” that simulates Mj when given only fs′⌈logm′⌉(x
′
s)
where the running time of Mj” is at most doubled when compared to the running time of Mj.
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We now explain how to construct a TM M ′ that inverts infinitely many inputs z using M
and show this implies a violation of our assumption that fk k = 1, 2, 3, . . . is a one-way function.
Let b be the constant that is presumed to exist by the definition of one-way function such that
fk : {0, 1}
k → {0, 1}k
b
. Given an input z, M ′j checks if |z| = N
b for some N divisible by i. Clearly
this can be done in time polynomial in |z|. If not, M ′j halts and outputs some fixed constant, say
0. (In this case |z| 6= i⌈log n⌉ for some n.) If |z| = N b and N = ik, note that since i ≥ 60r,
k ≤ |z|1/b/60r. M ′j then computes
Mj(1
2k , (f⌈logn⌉(x1), . . . , f(i−1)⌈log n⌉(xi−1), z, f(i+1)⌈log n⌉(xi+1), . . . , f⌈logn⌉2(x⌈log n⌉)),
where x1, . . . , xi−1, xi+1, . . . , xlogn are randomly chosen inputs of the appropriate length. That is,
we give Mj as input a tuple that includes z in the appropriate position padded out by randomly-
chosen elements of the right form. Since Mj runs in time n
r (remember we measure the running
time of Mj in terms of the number of 1’s, that is, n = 2
k), Mj computes an output given this input
in time 2kr. Finally, M ′j checks to see if the output yi of Mj inverts z (with respect to fi⌈logn⌉). If
so, this is what it outputs; otherwise it outputs some 0. It is easy to verify that if z = fi⌈logn⌉(x)
for some x and n (in which case n = 2k), then M ′j inverts z with probability at least
1
2i⌈log n⌉/10
.
Moreover, inverting z can be done in time 2kr + p(|z|), where p is some polynomial in z. Since
i ≥ 60r, k = ⌈log n⌉, and |z| = (i⌈log n⌉)b, it can be done in time at most 2i⌈log n⌉/60 + p′(i⌈log n⌉),
where p′ is some polynomial. Clearly 2i⌈log n⌉/60 + p′(i⌈log n⌉) ≤ 2i⌈log n⌉/30 for all n sufficiently
large, so we can modify M ′j so that it runs in time at most 2
i⌈log n⌉/30 for all n. This contradicts
the assumption that fk, k = 1, 2, 3, . . . is a one-way function.
It is easy to check that
∑⌈logn⌉2
i=60r
1
2i⌈log n⌉/10
≤ 1/n3r. By the union bound and our previous claim,
the probability each player will have strictly more than 60r hits is o(1) for n sufficiently large. On the
other hand, the first player can obtain 60r+1 hits in time at most O(n60r+2+o(1)); for all i ≤ 60r+1,
it can find yi such that fi⌈logn⌉(yi) = fi⌈logn⌉(xi) in time O((i · ⌈log n⌉)
t2i·⌈log n⌉) = O(ni+o(1)) by
exhaustively examining every string in {0, 1}i⌈log n⌉, as we assume there exists a TM M that can
compute fi⌈logn⌉(xi) in time |xi|
t for some constant t. Therefore, player can switch from M1 to a
TM M∗1 that runs in time O(n
60r+2) and strictly improve his utility in Gn by an expected amount
of at least 1− n−r for all n sufficiently large, contradicting the definition of Nash equilibrium.
This already shows that there is no ǫ-NE for ǫ ≤ 1. An analogous argument shows that given
a purported ǫ-equilibrium (M1,M2) with 1 < ǫ ≤ B, for all B > 1, where M1 and M2 run in time
at most nr, we can find a TM M∗ for the first player, that runs in time O(n60r+B+2) that gives an
expected utility improvement of at least B + 1− n−r for player 1. It follows that for all ǫ, there is
no ǫ-NE.
Similar ideas can be applied to show there is a 2-player extensive-form polynomial game that
has no polynomial ǫ-NE, where we no longer need to use a type space. (See [8] for the defini-
tion of extensive-form polynomial game and polynomial ǫ-NE in extensive-form polynomial games;
we hope that our discussion suffices to give the reader an intuitive sense.) In the game Gn, in-
stead of the tuple (f⌈logn⌉(x
j
1), . . . , fl⌈logn⌉(x
j
l )) being player j’s type, player j chooses x
j
1, . . . , x
j
l
at random and sends this tuple to player 3 − j. Again, player j attempts to invert as many of
f⌈logn⌉(x
1−j
1 ), . . . , fl⌈logn⌉(x
1−j
l ) as it can; they payoffs are just as in the Bayesian game above. A
proof similar to that of Theorem 1 shows that this game does not have a polynomial NE.
The one-way function game also shows the affect of restricting strategies to be polynomial-time
computable. Clearly, withtout this restriction, the game has a trivial NE: all players correctly
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invert every element of their tuple. On the other hand, consider a modification of the game where
in Gn, a player’s type consists of a single element fn(xn), with xn a bitstring of length n chosen
uniformly at random. If both players simultaneously invert or fail to invert fn(xn), then both get
zero. Otherwise, the player who correctly inverts gets 1 and the other player gets −1. Again, it
is easy to see that if we take M to be the family of all TMs, the only Nash equilibrium is to find
yn, zn such that fn(yn) = fn(zn) = f(xn). But if M consists of only polynomial-time TMs, then it
is a polynomial-time NE for both players to simply output a random string, as neither player can
invert f with non-negligible probability, and we ignore negligible additive increase to the utilities
of players.
4 Equilibrium With Respect to Concrete Time Bounds
The previous example may lead one to speculate that lack of Nash equilibrium in computational
games hinges on asymptotic issues, namely, our ability to consider larger and larger action and
type spaces. This raises the question of what happens if we restrict our attention to games where
players are constrained to execute at most T computational steps, where T > 0 is a fixed integer.
It turns out that if the use of randomness is counted as a computational action, then there may
not be Nash equilibria, as the following example shows. We assume from now on that T > 2.
In our computational game, the family of admissible TMs, which we denote by MT , is the set
of all probabilistic TMs whose running time is upper-bounded by T . The operation of printing
a character takes one computational step, and so does the movement of the cursor to a different
location on the tape. The generation of a random bit (or alternatively querying a bit in a designated
tape that contains random bits) requires at least one computational step (we allows arbitrary bias
of a bit, as it does not effect the proof).
Consider the following 2-player zero-sum normal-form computational game F between Alice
(A) and Bob (B). For every n, Fn is the same game F . The action space of each player is {0, 1}
T .
By our choice of MT , both players are constrained to perform at most T computational steps.
The game proceeds as follows. A and B use TMs MA,MB ∈ MT respectively, to compute their
strategies. MA outputs a single bit a1. MB outputs b1 ∈ {0, 1}. Based on a1 and b1, a game of
matching pennies is played. Namely, if a1 = b1, A gets 1, otherwise B gets 1. In the second phase
of the game, the TM of each player prints as many characters as possible without violating the
constraint of performing at most T steps. If the final number of characters is the same for both
players, then both get a payoff of 0 for the second phase. Otherwise the player with a larger number
of printed characters gets an additional bonus of 1.
Theorem 2. The computational game F does not have an ǫ-MT -NE, for all ǫ < 1.
Proof. Assume, by way of contradiction, that (MA,MB) is a Nash equilibrium for F . Since TMs
in MT are constrained to query at most T bits, it follows that the strategy computed by MA (or
MB) given 1
n, will be the same for all n > T . As the outcomes of the games Fm, m ≤ T , do not
effect, by our definition of NE in computational games, whether (MA,MB) is an equilibrium, we
can assume w.l.o.g that both MA and MB compute the same strategy (whether mixed or pure) in
all games Fn.n ≥ 1.
Suppose that one of the players uses randomization. Assume this is player A. Namely, MA
generates a random bit before outputting a1. Then A can guarantee a payoff for the first phase
(the matching pennies game) that is no smaller than his current payoff by choosing a TM M ′A that
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outputs a deterministic best response a1 against against the strategy of B in the matching penny
game. Observe that we can assume that a1 is “hardwired” to M
′
A. In particular outputting a1 can
be done in a single computational step. Then A can print strictly more 1’s in the second phase of
the game by configuring M ′A to print T −1 1’s (which can be done in T −1 steps). If B prints T −1
in the second phase of the game, we have that A can increase its payoff in Fn for all n by switching
to M ′A. If, on the other hand, MB prints less than T −1 characters in the second step, an analogous
argument shows that B can strictly increase its payoff in Fn for all n, by using a TM that runs in
at most T steps. In any event, we get a contradiction to the assumption that (MA,MB) is a NE.
Suppose now that A does not use randomization. In this case, it follows immediately by the
definition of matching-pennies that either A or B can strictly improve their payoff in the first phase
of Fn for all n, by outputting the (deterministic) best response to their opponent and printing T −1
characters afterwards. As before, we can assume this response is hardwired to the appropriate TM,
such that outputting it consumes one computational step, allowing players to print T −1 characters
in the second phase of the game.
Finally, it is not difficult to verify that the argument above establishes that F does not have an
ǫ-NE for ǫ-NE for all ǫ ∈ (0, 1).
One might wonder whether the non-existence of NE in computational games follows from the
fact that we are dealing with an infinite sequence of games with infinitely many possible TMs (e.g.,
|M| = ∞). Nash Theorem regarding the existence of NE requires that the action space of every
player is finite; without this requirement a NE may fail to exist. Hence it is natural to ask whether
limiting |M| to be finite (for example, taking M to be the family of all TMs over a fixed alphabet
with at most S states for some bound S) may force the existence of NE in computational games.
Theorem 2 illustrates that this is not the case: F will not have a NE even if we take M to consist
only of TMs whose number of states is upper bounded by a large enough positive number S (S
should allow for using the TM that is hardwired to output the appropriate best response in the
matching pennies game and print T − 1 characters in the second phase). The reason why NE does
not exist despite the finiteness of M, is that in contrast to ordinary games, where a mixed actions
of best responses is a best response, in our setting this is not necessarily true: mixing over actions
may consume computational resources, forcing players to choose actions that are suboptimal when
using randomized strategies.
5 Conclusion
We have examined sequences of games where TMs compute strategies of players. We demonstrated
that NE for polynomial time players may not exist. The implications are twofold: first it hints
that in competitive situation between agents that can use more running times or faster algorithms
to improve their outcomes, there may evolve a “computational arms race” which does not admit
NE. Second, it entails that classic notions in game theory such as best-response should be treated
carefully when considering sequence of games with time-bounded players. Specifically, these notions
may fail to exist even if we ignore negligible effects on the utility of players (as in the definition of
polynomial time NE).
There are several factors that may imply the existence of equilibrium when considering a se-
quence of games. For example, when the number of states of the TM used by players is bounded
there may exist an equilibrium. Studying properties of games or TMs used by players that result
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with equilibrium in sequences of games seem as an interesting direction for future research. It
might also prove worthwhile to study the effect of limiting resources other than time such as space
or the amount of randomness used by players.
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